As the strategic environment is changing at an exponential rate, so must strategic military leaders of the 21st century. These leaders will be thrust into situations requiring interaction with members of the interagency and other civilian-led organizations and therefore must be prepared to deal with cultures and thought processes that differ from the military's. This "pentathlete," as Army Chief of Staff GEN Peter J. Schoomaker calls him, must develop new skills in order to thrive and affect change in organizations manned with predominately civilian employees.
Military strategic leaders can no longer rely on rote or uniform approaches for building support and guiding and managing change. To remain effective, military leaders must gain a better understanding of the complexity and nuances of managing diverse civilian organizations including developing competencies on a wide range of concepts and skills that have traditionally been anathema to the military -"consensus building," "negotiation," and "broad-based empowerment." As the future strategic environment calls for increased collaboration and consensus building between and within military and civilian organizations, the Department of Defense must adapt its training, leader development and educational programs to prepare future leaders to more effectively lead increasingly diverse organizations and successfully manage change.
THE "CURRENT" COMMANDER: UNDERSTANDING AND EFFECTING CHANGE IN CIVILIAN ORGANIZATIONS
The decision as to whether an order has authority or not lies with the person to whom it is addressed, and does not reside in 'person of authority;' or those who issue orders.
-Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive Although in today's volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) world the differences between direct, organizational and strategic leadership have become blurred, there are still unique knowledge, skills, and abilities that are more prevalent at the strategic level than at the other two levels of leadership. 1 Tactical and operational fluency give way to an entirely new language -e.g., "consensus building," "negotiation," and "broad-based empowerment."
This can be difficult for military personnel who are trained for rapid decision-making in a hierarchical, mostly unicultural organization. 2 The transition is both complex and difficult and the tenets are challenging enough to constitute the foundation for senior leader development within the United States Army War College (USAWC) Strategic Leadership curriculum. USAWC defines strategic leadership as "the process used by a leader to effect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment which is marked by opportunities and threats." 3 This paper will identify "new" competencies required by the transition to strategic military leadership of civilian organizations in the 21 st century operational environment and provide a review of theories pertinent to understanding these new skills. It will then examine factors that affect change management within predominately civilian organizations. The paper will conclude with recommendations on how strategic military leaders can overcome interpersonal challenges and build guiding coalitions to effect change in civilian organizations.
The Onerous Transition
The transition from direct and organizational leadership roles to strategic military leadership positions is difficult. The difficulty is due not only because of a wider range of influences, but, for many, it will be the first time they will interact with, lead and manage 4 This is particularly true in the Army, where transformation is taking a competitive stance against traditional jurisdictions of the service. 5 The monumental scope of this difference requires focused study and preparation prior to assuming command of, or leadership positions in, a predominately civilianmanned organization. Even as the Department of Defense is already undergoing a dramatic transformation in both its organizational structure and management processes, the Secretary of Defense has increased the priority of another mission set -one requiring exponentially more coordination and involvement with, and understanding of, civilian organizations -Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.
The increased emphasis on SSTR operations will require fully integrated civilian and military efforts. Whether conducting or supporting SSTR operations, the Department of Defense must be manned, trained and equipped to work closely with relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional international organizations, U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations, and private sector individuals and for-profit companies. 6 In many respects, success in SSTR operations will be dependent upon the willing and voluntary participation of diverse and disparate strategic level organizations and agencies, whose solicitation, cooperation and synchronization of activities will, in turn, depend upon the skill of the strategic military leader.
The total number, range and extent of required strategic leader competencies are beyond the scope of this paper to elucidate; instead this paper will focus on a small but important skill set designed for interaction with civilian-based organizations. His eight-stage change process includes:
• Establish a sense of urgency -urgency is crucial to gain needed cooperation, power, credibility and momentum for change
• Create the guiding coalition -a strong team with the right composition, trust and a common objective is necessary to overcome organizational complacency
• Develop a vision and strategy -leaders must frame a picture of the future with a compelling reason for creating that future
• Communicate the change vision -there must be a common understanding of the goals and direction of change
• Empower employees for broad-based action -help people become more powerful in order to take action to eliminate barriers to change
• Generate short-term wins -provide convincing evidence that the effort is worthwhile
• Consolidate gains and produce more change -reinvigorate processes to stave off reversion
• Anchor new approaches in the culture -developing processes to ensure continued success and making direct ties between success and positive change 12 Kotter's framework for leading and managing change postulates several key activities dependent upon in-depth understanding of the target population. Within organizations predominately populated by civilians, cross-cultural savvy is paramount. Selecting the right civilian membership as part of the guiding coalition, understanding the culture and perspectives of civilian members so that the adopted vision will resonate both horizontally and vertically within the organization, and empowering the right civilian managers so that change efforts between organizational levels are effective, consistent and timely, all require adroit leadership and management skills and an in-depth understanding of the civilian workforce.
Importance of Understanding Civilian Culture
Understanding the unique aspects of civilian culture and how it influences organizational performance is essential for overcoming cultural impediments, attaining strategic objectives and successfully managing change. Culture is the sum total of all the shared, taken-for-granted assumptions that a group has learned throughout its history. 13 It is a long lasting, complex set of shared expectations consisting of the collective attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterize the larger institution. 14 The strategic leader must demonstrate cross-cultural savvy in order to effectively work within different cultures (and sub-cultures) and limit potential friction while pursuing strategic objectives. behaviors and sub-group norms is not possible through sheer force of will, but rather requires leaders who are adept at relating to employees in a way that is, at times, anathema to career military members. Thus, effective leadership of civilian employees requires a deliberate effort to build working relationships with individuals and sub-groupings of individuals to establish a foundation of trust and shared interests. 18 Effecting change in civilian organizations requires the identification of the various influences, personalities, and groups (including both in-and outgroups) that impact mission success, and the formulation of a management approach to amalgamate them into a high-performing strategic team.
Differences in Military and
Organizational changes often require five to ten years to come to fruition, and are even difficult to achieve in well-established military cultures. Given that the military routinely retains strategic leaders in command for only 2-3 years, it is imperative that strategic military leaders of civilian organizations identify a guiding coalition that can lend legitimacy to the effort and marshal the resources and institutional support required to induce organizational members to change, 19 especially after the "initiating" commander's departure. Kotter asserts that leaders often launch organizational renewal efforts, but "whenever some minimum mass is not achieved early in the effort, nothing much worthwhile happens." 20 Often this coalition is a confederation of disparate groups, personalities, and egos, requiring leader proficiency in consensus building, negotiation, and broad-based empowerment skills. It is within this management framework that this paper addresses specific challenges and influences that affect a strategic military leader's ability to lead change in a civilian organization. • Learn the strengths and weaknesses of key personnel
• Scrutinize the continuity within the organization
• Objectively look at your predecessor (if possible)
• After three months at the helm, in a philosophy letter to the work force, address the rich and successful history of the organization, the commitment of the organization to specific goals, the requirement for personal and institutional integrity, your strategic vision, the policy of decentralization and empowerment of subordinate leaders, the need for innovation, and the process by which creative ideas move up in the organization 21 Similarly, in The Dynamics of Taking Charge, John J. Gabarro, a professor in organizational behavior and human resource management at Harvard Business School, outlines the activities and the problems faced by new leaders after they begin new jobs and actually take charge. Gabarro conducted three sets of field studies over three years involving 17 management successions in organizations in the United States and Europe. Although results showed myriad ways of taking charge, the research revealed distinct stages of improvement through which all new leaders transitioned and several "taking charge" patterns. Most notable was that for organizations within the US, it took from two-and-a-half to three years for managers to progress through these stages and even longer for some European and U.K. senior-level managers. 22 Additionally, Gabarro concludes that it takes between three to seven months just to complete what he calls the Taking-Hold stage. This is a period in which the new leader gains "orientational and evaluative learning and begins to take corrective action." Following this assessment the leader can devise a strategy for building informal and formal support networks, devising and soliciting support from key sub-group members, and formulating a change approach that will mitigate cultural impediments and exploit available organizational support bases.
Assessing the Civilian Employees and Building a Network
As indicated above, the initial period of taking charge by the leader also stimulates a range of responses from the resident civilian managers. It is during this period that leaders can make their initial assessment and begin formulating an optimal management approach based upon the hand they have been dealt. Concurrently, the civilian managers and executives are developing their own unique responses to the leader's assumption of control…and sending signals that allow for interpretation and eventual management. Within certain limitations, these responses can be categorized to facilitate interpretation. The intent is to establish a typology that will aid the leader in identifying both the attitude and potential of certain sub-groups of civilian employees and can also be used to devise change management strategies to exploit or avoid their potential influence. This paper proposes four different sub-organizational groupings:
Seditionists, Skeptics, Saluters, and Supras, identifies the motivations of these groups, relates them to theories aforementioned in the Leading People and Leading Change sections, and offers methods for dealing with them in accomplishing organizational objectives.
The Seditionists
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law defines sedition as "creating a revolt, disturbance, or violence against lawful civil authority with the intent to cause its overthrow or destruction." While the Seditionists in the organization likely will not actively work to destroy the organization or overthrow its leader physically, they will try to minimize the leader's influence and stymie progress. They are motivated by their individual power and preserving the bureaucracy and status quo. They will publicly state that the leader is the "current" commander, and they will resist any major deviation from status quo and question the credibility and legitimacy of any leader action. They are vehemently opposed to change because, if the leader is successful in effecting change, it is only a matter of 24 months (or less) and the next "current" commander will change things, possibly back to the way they were before. Generally, they consider any proposed change as "not worth the effort." Regardless of the innovation of the change proposal, their response is usually characterized by a "we've tried that before and it didn't work" retort.
Seditionists include other groupings referred to by Kriegel and Brandt (1996) as Heel Draggers, Saboteurs, Ostriches, and Antagonists. 26 While many in this group may be highly proficient at their jobs, they are usually in the "out-group" referred to by Northouse in his LMX theory -and they are likely to remain there. They habitually decide to remain in the Stranger Phase of the leader-member relationship, choosing to distance themselves from the hierarchy due to their belief that they themselves actually hold the power in the organization. They see new leadership as a threat to their peer-referent power.
Dealing with Seditionists -Neutralization
Dealing with Seditionists is a difficult and time-consuming activity, especially if the leader decides to try to engage them head-on. Pursuing Seditionists for consensus usually fuels their power base and can drive them farther from consensus. Due to the finite nature of the leader's tenure, the most effective way to deal with this group is to neutralize them -refrain from efforts to enlist them directly, but instead withdraw their power base by taking away their ability to say "no." Seditionists revel in the fact that they have the power to say "no" -the bureaucracy they seek is replete with nay-sayers who impede progress to preserve power and indirectly avoid additional work. Strategic leaders should consider countering the Seditionists by lowering the level in the organization where employees can say yes and actually raise the level at which no is dictated. This is a difficult challenge, for finding the right level is more art than science and will therefore differ in every level of every organization. While the leader may never enlist this group or receive their consensus, diminishing their power base will allow the leader to focus the organization's finite energy on those members who can truly be enlisted.
The Skeptics
While Skeptics may at times assume similar postures as the Seditionists, they tend to be less adamant about opposing change than they are doubtful that change will benefit the organization. They will not actively seek failure of proposed changes, but instead will withhold their support until they have assessed the leader's trustworthiness and sincerity. They are motivated by trust. Initially they do not intrinsically accept that a leader is worthy of their support. They want to improve how they are treated, either personally or organizationally and will reserve support until they deem a leader worthy of their extra efforts required to effect change. They are more likely to sit back and carefully observe how leaders treat them and their organization, since leaders are transient and "unknown." Alienated Followers 27 (Kelley; 1992), Dissenters, and Fence Riders 28 are included in this group. Skeptics place themselves in the "out-group" until they perceive a solid commitment from the leader that he will perform for the organization. Many Skeptics, who may end up being effective followers, see leaders merely as co-adventurers on a worthy crusade, and if they suspect their leader of flagging commitment or conflicting motives they may just withdraw their support, either by changing jobs or by contriving to change leaders. 29 Dealing with Skeptics -Sincerity
It is critical to win these forces over to the "in-group" for inclusion in the guiding coalition.
They will become cynical if they think their leader is dealing with deep problems superficially. Big Egos and Snakes can be extremely intelligent, motivated and productive in certain ways. As such, they can get promoted to senior management positions and be logical candidates for a guiding coalition. Smart change agents seem to be skilled at spotting these people and keeping them off the team. If that's impossible, capable leaders watch and manage these folks very carefully. Organizations are often reluctant to confront the issue, usually because these people have either special skills or political support. But the alternative is usually worse -having them undermine a new strategy or a cultural renewal effort. 33 The most dangerous Skeptic is Kotter's (1990) "Reluctant Player" -"the individual in the organization whose involvement is essential, but for whom there is no high urgency for change, and who is reluctant to sign on to the change, citing lack of both time and qualification to help." interacts and influences on a daily basis. With complacency high, you will never convince him to give the time and effort needed to create a winning coalition. 35 The Saluters
Saluters are quick and vociferous in their support of proposed changes. They are motivated by stability -"get it over with and get back to business." They know that change, especially in a military-led organization, is inevitable, and they want to try to minimize their pain.
These forces are usually considered part of the "in-group" -leaders breathe a sigh of relief and believe they are "on board" due to quick compliance with proposed changes. Kelley's (1992)
Sheep, Yes People, and Survivors 36 are all part of this group.
Dealing with Saluters -Trust, but Verify Saluters, by their very nature, move quickly to the "in-group." However, leaders must not
give into temptation and forego required maintenance on this group. Often they will unknowingly impede change simply by not taking time for introspection or formulation of the optimal way to implement change. They tend to refrain from giving advice because "the boss says do it this way," even though they might foresee a better way of operating or implementing the change.
Leaders must temper Saluters' energy and desire to "move out quickly" and keep in balance the requirement for increased guidance and oversight while maintaining the Saluters' forward momentum. President Reagan perfectly summed up this concept -trust, but verify -when discussing possible warming American relations with the Soviet Union in the 1980s. However, if
the Saluters perceive that their leader does not trust them -manifested by too much guidance and oversight -they sometimes lose momentum and join the "out-group" ranks of the Skeptics.
The Supras
The last of the groups is the Supras. Like Saluters, they can also be quick to support proposed change. They need oversight, but the major difference is the Supras' motivesecurity of their egos -making them possibly the most difficult and dangerous group with whom the leader will interact. They are the former power brokers (the cronies) in the organization who perceive that they have lost the influence they previously enjoyed solely due to the change of command. They were either brought in by the former regime or had been successful in being part of the "in-group." With the recent transition of leadership, their very foundation is on shaky ground for they do not know whether their relationship with the new leader will bear similar fruit as with the previous regime. Supras desperately want to regain recognition and harmony, and will do seemingly anything to secure a place in the new "in-group." They will be quick to publicly support anything the leader recommends, and will work hard to garner his trust and confidence. They exemplify traits inherent in the Partner Phase of the leader-member relationship and they are looking for opportunities to show their trust and confidence in the leader and their willingness to be on the "team."
Dealing with Supras -Question Individual Motives
Dealing with a Supra requires a delicate and nuanced approach. The strategic leader must identify the Supra's motive (each ego is different). The challenge is to question Supra feedback to ensure it is sound and not just something that will garner favor without, in the interim, alienating these potentially effective allies in change management. While Supras outwardly espouse that "the change is good," inwardly they are reeling from the recent leadership transition and seek positional security. They will seemingly do anything to attain it, even if their actions end up, either purposely or serendipitously, being detrimental to the organization. If the Supra's motive is self-aggrandizement, a good rule of thumb is to give him some counseling and then send him off to a job that takes him away from the headquarters, 37 if possible and as appropriate. Personnel changes may be difficult in government, but they are not impossible, and the effort is usually worth it. 38 If a Supra is truly an asset to the mission, and his reinstatement will benefit the organization's posture for change, the leader should give him a sense of security by telling him that he is a respected member of the group of whom much is expected. He can be effective in providing continuity while the new leader tackles the task of building the strategic team for the organization.
Building the Strategic Team
Teambuilding is indispensable in all organizations, but uniquely challenging at the strategic level. Powerful sub-cultures and both social and political networks render ineffective the traditional leadership and teambuilding strategies used at lower operational levels. In order to build the strategic team, the leader must first establish and effectively communicate a clear vision for the organization -without this essential first step, all subsequent efforts at teambuilding are problematic. He must then negotiate the obstacles inherent in the organization's sub-cultures in order to assess organizational strengths and challenges, the result of which is the identification and consolidation of existing backers. Next, in the effort to win over as many supporters as possible, the leader must continually seek to develop highquality "in-group" type relationships with as many groups and subordinates as possible, both vertically (up to bosses and down through the ranks) and horizontally (peers and key external organizations). This effort results in the identification of social and political support partnerships and networks (formal and informal) throughout the organization that the leader, much like an alchemist transmutes base metal to gold, must then transform into a strategic team to achieve his vision.
The strategic leader's teambuilding challenges are compounded by the fact that he must influence individuals and sub-groups within and external to the organization over which he has relatively little direct control or only tangential authority. Overcoming organizational inertia and dealing with inherent cultural complexities requires adroit management and interpersonal skills.
Successful leaders build effective core teams from the most influential and essential organizational members. This requires a team building "strategy" that solicits and recruits the most critical members using the most appropriate messages. Concurrently, the team building efforts must also establish an informal network of team members within and external to the organization whose active support may not be immediately required but whose "buy in" may ensure the long term viability of the change effort. The resultant strategic team is a combination of a "close-knit alliance of the solicited needed" and a "loose coalition of the enticed willing." 
